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April 2001 
Nondisclosures by Sellers, Brokers, and Home Inspectors 
ROGER BERNHARDT 
Midcourse Correction is not a very appropriate title for this particular column, as there is 
little to change in one’s practice as a result of the decisions in Leko v Cornerstone Home 
Inspection (2001) 86 CA4th 1109, 103 CR2d 858 (reported on p 123) and Expressions at Rancho 
Niguel Ass’n v Ahmanson Devs., Inc. (2001) 86 CA4th 1135, 103 CR2d 895 (reported on p 119). 
Nonetheless, the decisions are worth noting because of th ir extensive and intelligent coverage of 
so many legal issues. They resolve several questions, s  I am going to use them as an occasion to 
summarize the many issues involved when real estate purchasers believe that someone didn’t tell 
them the full story about the condition of the property they acquired and want to sue someone 
because of it.  
If you represent the seller’s side of the situation, the advice to give beforehand is pretty 
simple and unqualified: When you possess important information about the property, disclose it. 
Hiding anything other than certain legally protected facts (such as the race of one of the parties 
or a neighbor, or that the seller has AIDS) will probably make your client liable, if he or she is at 
all involved in the transaction. If the failure to disclose has already occurred, what follows may 
shed some light on the question of whether to settle or itigate. 
1. If a seller or one of the brokers or a home inspector onceals or intentionally fails to 
disclose defects in the property to the buyers, is there liability? Yes, and the suppression is 
probably fraud (except for legally protected facts like those mentioned above). Even if the 
information does not materially affect value, buyers can still rescind if they can show that the 
undisclosed fact was important to them personally. 
2. If a seller, broker, or home inspector negligently fails to discover or disclose defects in 
the property, is there liability? Sometimes. As a prerequisite, the defendant must owe a duty to 
disclose to the buyer, and that is not always the case.  
a. Sellers. Sellers of real property owe a duty to disclose materi l facts to their buyers, but 
only if they actually know of those facts. Sellers do not have a duty to inspect to find out the 
condition of the property and then report it to thebuyer. (The Real Estate Transfer Disclosure 
Statement (TDS), prescribed for one- to four-unit residential properties, asks sellers to declare 
what they are “aware” of, in contrast to the broker’s part of the TDS, which requires a 
“reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection.” CC §1102.6. In sales of larger properties 
(i.e., more than four units), in which no TDS is required, noninspection and/or nondisclosure is 
even less likely to be actionable.)  
Although the duty to disclose known defects may tempt sellers to keep their eyes closed 
as much as possible, I doubt that sellers who have “reason to know” of a defect (e.g., as 
evidenced by the presence of similar conditions elsewhere on the premises) are safe in failing to 
relay that information to the buyers or to one of the brokers in the deal. The fact that one has no 
affirmative duty to investigate is not the same as being entitled to shut one’s mind to the obvious 
inferences of what one already knows about the property. 
In summary, if sellers know or have reason to believ  that the plumbing leaked or the 
foundation sagged, they better disclose that fact; but if they truly don’t know about a problematic 
condition, they do not have to go looking for it befor  the sale.  
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b. Home Inspectors. The business of home inspection is governed by Bus & P C §§7195–
7199 and is defined as “a noninvasive, physical examin tion, performed for a fee in connection 
with a transfer . . . of real property.” Bus & P C §7195(a). Section 7196 imposes a clear duty on 
home inspectors “to conduct a home inspection with the degree of care that a reasonably prudent 
home inspector would exercise.” Although that standard seems somewhat circular, the legislative 
preamble instructs courts to “consider the standards of practice and code of ethics” of the 
California Real Estate Inspection Association (CREIA) and the American Society of Home 
Inspectors (ASHI), both of which have detailed and usable standards. Furthermore, Bus & P C 
§7198 explicitly makes the inspection duty nonwaivable, which I assume means that it is also 
nonmodifiable. Although “home inspection” is limited to the examination of a “residential 
dwelling of one to four units” (Bus & P C §7195(a)), it is unlikely that a person who inspects a 
five-unit building owes a different duty, because th  CREIA and ASHI standards don’t limit 
themselves to these smaller residential units. 
The statute only hints at who is to be benefited by careful home inspection. Its preamble 
says its purpose is to “assure that consumers of home inspection services can rely upon the 
competence of home inspectors,” but the “consumer” could often be the real estate broker rather 
than the buyer of the property being inspected (as w  partly the case in Leko). ASHI standards 
state that they are intended to help buyers, while CREIA standards refer to clients rather than 
buyers. Despite the statutory vagueness, Leko is pretty clear on this matter. By holding negligent 
home inspectors liable not only to their own nonpurchasing clients, but also to subsequent 
purchasers who did not even pay for the report, the court ruled that home buyers are the parties 
protected by the statute and, accordingly, the oneswed the duty of care.  
Leko denies negligent home inspectors the defense of lack of privity, and also makes it 
clear that they cannot create this defense through contractual language. The court held that a 
declaration in the report that it may not be used by anyone else would not preclude a finding that 
the inspector could reasonably foresee that third parties would rely on the report. That makes it 
pretty unlikely that a better-drafted protective clause would make much of a difference. A 
negligent home inspector is probably going to be liable to whichever reader of the report ends up 
buying the property. Whether that also applies to a res le (B purchased from A, who first ordered 
the report), rather than a sale to an alternative buyer (B purchased instead of A) is much less 
clear.  
Comparing sellers with home inspectors, sellers may not have negligence liability, but 
inspectors will (both as to the first and later buyers). In the case of intentional concealment, both 
sellers and inspectors face liability, and that liabi ty likely runs beyond the first purchaser. See 
my article, Bernhardt, You Can Sell But You Can’t Hide, 18 CEB RPLR 182 (May 1995).  
c. Brokers.The question of what duties brokers owe is trickier b cause the variables of 
agency status and type of property qualify any answer. When a one- to four-unit dwelling is 
involved, a broker representing the buyers owes them “a fiduciary duty of utmost care, integrity, 
honesty, and loyalty,” whereas a broker who represents only the sellers owes the buyers 
“[d]iligent exercise of reasonable skill and care . . . honest and fair dealing and good faith . . . 
[and a] duty to disclose all facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property” tha 
are known to the broker but not known to the buyers. CC §2079.16. A dual agent seems to owe 
the buyers both such duties. See CC §2079.16. (I have commented elsewhere on the absurdity of 
these definitional distinctions; see my article refe nced above.) In addition, a seller’s broker has 
a duty “to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered 
for sale and to disclose to that prospective purchaser ll facts materially affecting the value or 
desirability of the property that an investigation would reveal.” CC §2079(a). As far as the 
buyer’s broker is concerned, there is both a comparable statutory duty and the even higher fiduci-
ary obligations of utmost care, etc., which clearly impose similar inspection obligations. (The 
TDS set forth in CC §1102.6 contains representations by both agents based on their inspections, 
adding an extra provision only for the seller’s broker to disclose what she has learned from the 
sellers themselves.) Thus brokers, like home inspectors, owe a duty to buyers to inspect one- to 
four-unit properties and will be liable for negligently failing to do so, even though sellers don’t 
have to do the same.  
None of the above statutes apply to residential property containing more than four units. 
But half of what was said above still remains true: The buyer’s agent still remains a fiduciary, 
has a duty to disclose to her principals what she actually knows about the condition of the 
property, and probably has a duty to inspect and report to them about discovered and 
discoverable defects. On the other hand, the seller’s broker is not a fiduciary to the buyers, and 
thus has no common law or statutory duty to inspect on their behalf. In the case of larger 
properties, the seller’s broker is liable only for withholding any actual knowledge of defects she 
had, not for failing to go looking for such defects. She is like the sellers themselves—liable to 
the buyers for fraud but not for negligence.  
Subsequent owners of defective property can probably recover from brokers who 
fraudulently concealed defects in a prior transaction (as they can from sellers), because their loss 
is a foreseeable consequence of the fraud. For remote buyers to recover from a broker who 
negligently failed to discover a defect in a prior transaction, a court would have to find that the 
broker, like a home inspector, expected later parties to rely on statements she made to her own 
clients (in the TDS or otherwise), which seems somewhat unlikely.  
3. Are the standards for sellers, brokers, and home inspectors the same? Although sellers 
are not subject to negligence duties, home inspectors and brokers are, and the statutory language 
differs, respectively. Home inspectors are supposed to identify material defects in “the 
mechanical, electrical, or plumbing systems or the structural and essential components” of the 
home. Bus & P C §7195(a). Residential brokers are supposed to “conduct a reasonably 
competent and diligent visual inspection” and disclo e “all facts materially affecting the value or 
desirability of the property that an investigation would reveal.” CC §2079(a). These statutes 
certainly do not say the same thing, although they ma end up imposing the same practical duties 
in any given situation.  
Furthermore, the standard of care for home inspectors is based on the “degree of care that 
a reasonably prudent home inspector would exercise,” referring back to the professional 
organizations’ standards mentioned in section 2b above. Bus & P C §7196. For brokers, the 
standard is “the degree of care that a reasonably prudent real estate licensee would exercise and 
is measured by the degree of knowledge through education, experience, and examination, 
required to obtain a license.” CC §2079.2. Although the range of inspection is wider for 
brokers—almost any fact can materially affect value, whether it is an itemized component or not, 
and investigative duties are not limited to on-site or physical problems—their inspections are 
probably expected to be less intense. Furthermore, home inspectors are on the hook for four 
years (Bus & P C §7199), whereas brokers are liable for only two. CC §2079.4.  
Thus, there is the real possibility that liability may be imposed on one but not the other of 
the two professionals.  
4. What happens if more than one party is liable? Leko holds that negligence liability is 
joint and several for the two professionals, meaning that the buyers can choose to sue or recover 
entirely from either defendant alone. (The indivisible injury requirement is met if both 
defendants failed to discover or disclose the same def ct; the liabilities would be separate if 
different parties missed different defects, e.g., a plumbing leak was missed by the inspector, but a 
title or neighborhood problem was negligently not disclosed by the broker.)  
Regarding intentional concealment, I suppose that the broker, the home inspector, and the 
sellers could all be jointly and severally liable for suppressing the same defect. Since I cannot 
think why three individuals would independently deci  to fraudulently conceal the same defect 
from the buyers, a conspiracy seems necessarily involved, clearly justifying the shared liability. 
When one defendant is negligent and another is fraudulent, Leko declares in passing that 
the liability is not joint and several, but certainly each tortfeasor is individually liable for the 
injury he or she caused. Because California measures damages for negligence and fraud 
differently—compare CC §§3333 and 3343—the amounts might well be different in that case. 
Both Leko and Expressions uphold the application of equitable indemnity in allocating 
losses among the defendants. Leko allowed the brokers to cross-complain against home 
inspectors who were not originally sued by the buyers on the ground that the nondisclosures by 
both constituted a single injury to the buyers, even though the duties and theories of recovery 
might differ. Expressions permitted good faith settling developers and owners to eek indemnity 
from subcontractors even though the developers’ liability was strict and the subcontractors’ was 
based on negligence; comparative fault concepts could still be applied. I anticipate this would 
also apply when the shared liability (of sellers, brokers, and home inspectors) is based on fraud.  
Thus, while buyers may content themselves with goin after any one of the parties, the 
real struggle is probably going to be among defendants s to their proper share of the liability 
pot. Personal injury litigators deal regularly with comparative fault, and can probably do a decent 
job advising real estate attorneys how juries generally go about measuring such things.  
5. Defenses. A footnote in Leko raised the interesting question of whether brokers can 
rely on inspectors’ reports as a complete defense to liability to their principals. Civil Code 
§1102.4(c) allows a broker to hide behind the report of a “licensed engineer, land surveyor, 
geologist, structural pest control operator, contractor, or other expert.” Because the appeal in 
Leko involved only the broker and the inspector (but nothe buyers), the question of whether 
home inspectors are “other experts” was not before the court. On the one hand, there seems little 
sense in requiring a broker to reexamine the very same plumbing system that the home inspector 
has already inspected; on the other hand, it is not that burdensome for a broker (earning a 
respectable fee) to make a visual inspection of the same pipes herself, even if it is undoubtedly 
less competent and diligent than the home inspector’s ve sion of the same. 
If equitable apportionment ultimately leapfrogs the n gligence/fraud distinction, it is 
anybody’s guess how a jury will apportion liability among (1) sellers who falsely told their 
broker that the plumbing was in good order, (2) the sellers’ broker, who relayed that misstate-
ment to the buyers without independently confirming t, (3) the buyers’ broker, who failed to 
inspect at all, and (4) the home inspector, who inspected but failed to spot the leak.  
 
